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Remote evaluation and dynamically-extensible systems pose serious safety and security risks. 
Programming language design has a major role in overcoming some of these risks, hnportant  
research areas include designing suitable languages for remote evaluation, identitying appropriate 
security and safety properties for them, and developing provably-sound logics tor reasoning about 
the properties in the context of separate compilation and dynamic linking. 
Recently, there has been phenomenal growth in the use of the Internet, driven in 
part by HTTP  servers that make up the World Wide Web and new programming 
languages like Java [5]. This has rekindled interest in an area that Stamos and 
Gifford termed re.mote valuation [12]. In this paradigm, a client sends a procedure 
to a server to execute on its behalf. Tile server executes the procedure and returns 
the results to the client. This differs from remote procedure call (RPC) and other 
forms of gateway programming which are examples of server-side programming, not 
remote evaluation. 
Various languages have been proposed to support the paradigm. Among them 
are distributed dialects of Scheme [4; 7], Tcl (Safe-l-cl) which grew out of active 
messaging [2], Obliq [3] and General Magic's Telescript(tm) [14]. Sun's Java is also 
aimed at remote evaluation but from a slightly different perspective. With Java, a 
procedure in byte-code form, called an Applet, is downloaded from a Web server 
and executed within a browser on the client's machine. 
It has long been widely known that there are serious security risks associated with 
remote evaluation. By security, we mean server privacy, integrity and availability. 
Remote procedures that execute with server privileges and have access to server 
resources can compromise security. This is a real threat to the future of Internet 
computing and dynamic extensibility in OS kernels and active networks. 
Though attention has been given to security issues in this setting, they have not 
been treated with anywhere near the rigor tbund in other areas of security such 
as encryption. Languages like Obliq, Netscape's JavaScript and Java have', not been 
carefully designed from a security point of view. As new holes are discovered, they 
are patched, but it is not clear that this process will ever converge. One can never 
be sure that executing programs in these languages will not compromise security 
in some way. As a result, browsers tend to be quite paranoid when it comes to 
executing remote code. They implement rather restrictive security policies theft 
prevent all but very anemic applications from being executed remotely. 
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1. SECURITY PROPERTIES FOR PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES 
Many security issues in remote valuation can actually be addressed through careful 
and systematic programming language design. What is needed is a prow~bly-secure 
programming language, one whose design is guided by a need to preserve some set 
of explicitly-stated security properties. But what kinds of security properties do we 
want programs to have? First, we might expect he language to be, in some sense, 
safe. That is, it should have fieatures that promote robust code and avoid accidents, 
unlike C. We want a precise characterization f how a well-typed program can be- 
have when executed. New formulations of type soundness are n eded tbr imperative 
programming languages that specify all possible errors that can cause well-typed 
programs to abort according to the semantics. Traditional type soundness argu- 
ments merely rule out well-typed programs from evaluating to a special type-error 
value. These new fbrmulations will tbrce one to identify, in the semantics, vari- 
ous points where program execution should abort, tbr example, when attempting 
to dereference a dangling pointer. The idea is that a sale implementation of the 
language would then be required to detect these points. An open question is what 
teatures can a programming language have that allow it to be implemented saiely 
and efficiently? 
For other security properties, we can look to securit?t models for information 
flow in multi-level systems [9; 10; 11]. Various models such as, Noninterference [6], 
Separability [10] and Restrictiveness [8] have been proposed. They are basically 
properties of multi-level systems that say high-level system inputs do not interfere 
with low-level system outputs. Each security model offers a different notion of 
security. The Noninterference model, fbr example, addresses protection tbr program 
inputs only and is not a property of nondeterministic programs. It may be too weak 
in some cases. Consider programs that generate cryptographic keys, for example. 
They are expected to convert low-level input seeds into high-level output keys. 
Noninteri~renee would not be concerned with whether these keys wound up being 
low-level outputs. Separability, on the other hand, is a stronger notion of security 
and is a property of nondeterministic programs. However, its weakness is that 
it prohibits upward information flow from low-level inputs to high-level outputs, 
making it unsuitable tbr some applications. An important research direction is to 
identify an appropriate set of security properties for remote evaluation languages. 
2. PROOF SYSTEMS FOR SECURITY PROPERTIES 
It should be possible to enforce a set of desired security properties through a proof 
system for the language. Of course, whether the properties are enforced by the 
proof system must be shown through a soundness theorem which is stated with 
respect to the language's emantics. The theorem guarantees that all programs 
that have proofs in the system have the desired security property. For instance, 
a proof system has been designed to enibrce Noninterference in a deterministic, 
block-structured language and has been proved sound [15]. The proof system is 
tbrmulated as a type system so that well-typed programs have the Noninterterence 
property. Depending on the security model and programming language, getting a 
provable tbrmulation of soundness can be tricky. For example, Ban~tre t al. give 
an inibrmation flow logic tbr a nondeterministic language [1]. However, in order 
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for their tbrmulation of soundness (Proposition 1, pg. 58) to be true, the flow logic 
must be changed [13]. There are also algorithmic issues surrounding such proof 
systems. Is a particular proof system decidable? If so, can it be decided ehIiciently? 
The tuture of Internet computing and extensible systems holds great promise. 
A key to its success is security, and provably-secure programming language design 
will have a major role. 
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